The failure of competition and the consequent high and sticky interest rates in credit card markets have been the subject of a considerable amount of debate and research lately. This paper presents the first regression testing for the existence of price competition in a credit card market to be estimated free of dynamic panel bias using recent quarterly data from Turkey. The estimation reveals that even though the effect of the cost of funds on credit card rates is statistically significant, it is very weak. The paper thus provides empirical evidence for the failure of price competition in the Turkish credit card market.
A similar downward-sticky interest rate trend has not been observed in the other consumer credit (vehicle, housing, etc.) markets. Interest rates in these markets closely followed the decline in the cost of funds. The major reason of the decline in these interest rates was the increasing competition in consumer banking in 2000s.
2
In the credit card market, on the other hand, card-issuing banks adopted strategies to enhance customer loyalty and have been competing with non-price features (number of installments, card limits, rewards, etc.). 1 The weighted average credit card interest rate rose from 107% in the first quarter of 2000 to 181% in the second quarter of 2001. Some banks stopped advancing cash and reduced credit card limits in this period. See Aysan and Muslim (2006) . 2 The main source of profits for the banking industry throughout the 1990s was lending the government at high interest rates. This "low-risk, high return" period ended with the November 2000 and February 2001 financial crises. The tight fiscal policy after the crisis and the accompanying standby agreement with IMF have been beneficial in establishing stability in the economy. Due to lower inflation and higher growth rates, government bonds lost their attractiveness and banks shifted their focus to consumer credits market. Consequently, interest rates and profit margins in consumer credit markets decreased to competitive levels quickly with the increasing competition.
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High and sticky credit card interest rates are not unique to Turkey. Credit card interest rates are higher than other consumer credit interest rates all over the world.
Empirical evidence from other countries indicates that credit card interest rates are also downward-sticky and show asymmetric response to the changes in the cost of funds. In his seminal paper, Ausubel (1991) showed that although there were about 4,000 banks in the US credit card market and in that sense the market fitted the perfect competition model, the response of credit card interest rates to the decline in the cost of funds was very slow in the 1983-1987 period. In order to design and implement effective and efficient regulations, a rigorous analysis of the nature of competition in the market is necessary. In this study, the experience of the Turkish credit card market in recent years is examined and the price competition in this market is empirically analyzed by employing a quarterly data set of average credit card interest rates of all issuers in Turkey for the period between the second quarter of 2001 to the last quarter of 2006. Ausubel (1991) and Aysan and Muslim (2006) empirically analyzed the response of credit card interest rates to the changes in the cost of funds for the US and Turkish markets respectively, by using conventional fixed and random effects panel data models and instrumental variable techniques. We employ dynamic panel data models to better measure the response of credit card interest rates to the changes in the cost of funds. In that sense, we improve the methodology used in previous studies for similar estimations. Moreover, we cover an extended time period compared to the Aysan and Muslim (2006) study with the availability of new data.
System GMM regressions are run on a dynamic panel data model and it is shown that credit card interest rates are economically insensitive to the changes in the cost of funds. This result is an indication of the failure of price competition in the market.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next part, a brief summary of the recent developments and regulations in the Turkish credit card market is provided. In the third part, we survey the literature that examines price competition in credit card markets. In the fourth part, we empirically test for the existence of price competition in the Turkish credit card market. Lastly, section five concludes.
II. The Turkish Credit Card Market
Even though the first credit cards entered the Turkish market in 1968 with Diners Club, they were accessible only to high-income people and accepted at a small number of stores for more than two decades. There were only 554 thousands credit cards in Turkey in the early 1990s. High inflation rates, frequent economic crises and the consequent increases in consumer default rates delayed the development of the credit card market in the 1990s (Aysan and Muslim, 2006) . A number of benefits that credit cards provide such as not having to carry cash, being able to borrow at any time, enjoying the benefits of online shopping and gaining rebates, money points, actual gifts and travel miles increased their attractiveness for consumers. They also benefited from being able to pay in installments without any surcharge over the cash prices of goods, while merchants preferred credit cards over traditional methods of sales with installments, since credit Looking at the supply side of the market, there are 21 credit card issuers in Turkey. 5, 6 Three of them are public banks and eight of them are foreign banks. All of these issuers provide general corporate and individual banking services at the same time. The credit card market is quite concentrated. The market share of the six largest issuers is 87 percent in total outstanding balances and 80 percent in the number of customers (Table 2 ). However, banks' reluctance to decrease credit card rates in response to the decline in the cost of funds indicates that competition in the market is not concentrated on prices. Especially the largest issuers focus on strategies that will increase customer loyalty by providing non-price benefits to credit card customers. Until the imposition of the price ceiling in June 2006, they charged higher than average credit card interest rates, and they set their rates at the ceiling level afterwards. On the other hand, small issuers and public banks charged lower than average rates during the 4 Data for outstanding credit card balances, delinquent credit card loans, revolving credit card debt, and the number of credit card consumers are obtained from the Central Bank of Turkey. 5 In this study we do not consider the four small financial institutions which do not charge interest for credit cards. 6 Kocbank and Yapi Kredi merged under Yapi Kredi in the second half of 2006. This merger decreased the number of issuers in the market to 21. However in the empirical part of the paper we include data for 22 issuers since we cover the period until the second half of 2006. sample period, though still not succeeding in improving their market shares. This failure is an indication that on average customers are more concerned about nonprice benefits than interest rates.
An important dimension of the non-price competition among issuers in
Turkey is the number of the point of sales. Banks are not able to offer some nonprice benefits such as large numbers of installments, rebates and gifts for credit card transactions made through the POS's of other issuers. Thus consumers prefer to have the credit card of the issuers with large POS networks. The market leaders of credit card issuers also have the largest POS networks. This puts the smaller banks with smaller POS networks at a considerable disadvantage in non-price competition.
The high concentration in the market, and the high and sticky credit card interest rates point to the market power of these issuers. These, coupled with the increasing complaints from card holders and consumer organizations, paved the way for the first regulation in the credit card market in 2003, which was proved to be not very effective in reducing the credit card interest rates (Aysan and Yildiz, 2007) .
Consequently, the Bank and Credit Cards Law was enacted on March 1, 2006.
Authorized by this law, the Central Bank started imposing an interest rate ceiling at the beginning of each quarter, determined by adding 0.5 percentage points to the weighted average of credit card rates in the market.
However, most of the banks, especially larger banks, set their credit card rates at the maximum level allowed by the ceiling. These rates are perceived to be still very high by consumer organizations and the public at large. They deem further regulations to be necessary. Banks, on the other hand, claim that the industry is competitive, and that further regulations will seriously harm the profitability of the credit card business. In this case, banks may be compelled to reduce the quality and availability of their services, which would in turn discourage credit card usage and lead to economy-wide consequences. The resulting liquidity and credit constraints will prevent consumers from smoothing their consumption, thus reducing welfare.
Moreover, credit card usage is expected to decrease the size of the informal economy and increase tax revenue. Retailers support banks as well, fearing that their sales will decline. All these debates show that a rigorous analysis of the nature of competition in the market is necessary in order to design and implement effective and efficient regulations.
III. Theoretical Background
As a credit instrument, credit cards are inherently more costly than other credit types. To begin with, as they are uncollateralized, loans extended through credit cards expose banks to higher default risk. Credit cards also entail high liquidity risk. Banks commit to lending any amount up to the credit card limit, and the utilization of this credit, by withdrawing cash for instance, is solely at the discretion of consumers. As banks ex ante do not have information as to when and how much they are going to lend to credit card consumers, they have to keep provision equal to the difference between total credit card limits and total outstanding balances. Banks secure themselves against this liquidity risk by keeping short-term, low-yield securities or by being prepared to borrow short-term expensive funds (Shaffer and Thomas, 2007) . In that sense, funding of credit cards is more expensive than funding of other credit types. Furthermore, operating a credit card system entails huge investments in technology and other infrastructure. Banks also provide credit card consumers with many non-price benefits to such as money points, gifts and travel miles which again entail high costs. Lastly, credit card consumers do not make any payment during the grace period, which can be forty-five days in Turkey, and banks have to finance the card holders' purchases in this period.
All these factors are related to the nature of the credit card business, but explain the high cost of credit card borrowing only in part. When we consider that credit cards turn out to be the most profitable line of business for some banks in Turkey, credit card interest rates still seem to be very high, even after controlling for the above costs.
7 This observation suggests that the reasons for high credit card rates lie somewhere else.
There are various explanations for high credit card rates in the literature. A leading explanation is based on the customer structure in credit card markets.
Chakrovarti (2003) Despite the existence of sufficient numbers of competitors, Ausubel (1991) accounts for the failure in achieving competitive rates in credit card markets with low price elasticity on the demand side, emanating from search cost, switch cost and consumer irrationality, and asymmetric information on the supply side. Stating that search and switch costs are not sufficient to explain price stickiness, he categorizes credit card holders in three groups. The first group is made up of convenience users who never borrow and hence are insensitive to interest rates. These customers are not risky for a bank; however, they are costly and do not yield any profit opportunities.
The second group includes consumers who exhibit some sort of irrationality: they do not intend to borrow ex-ante, but somehow end up doing so ex-post. These consumers are generally low-risk and pay their debt, hence they are the preferred consumer group for banks. Since they do not plan to use the credit option of their cards ex-ante, their perceived expected benefit from switching to a lower rate card is lower than the cost of switching for these consumers. Therefore, they are not sensitive to credit card rates. Consumers in the third group plan to use the credit option of their cards, they are illiquid, and hence are risky and not preferred by banks. These customers are sensitive to interest rates because they actually intend to borrow and pay their debt. According to the new adverse selection theory suggested by Ausubel (1991) , in a situation where banks cannot differentiate between these three consumer types, a bank that unilaterally lowers its interest rate will attract only the consumers in the third group 10 . This theory is one of the fundamental explanations of banks' reluctance to compete in prices. Calem and Mester (1995) In Turkey, the asymmetric information problem is not a serious issue either. We believe that the switching cost and non-price competition through product differentiation arguments are more valid for the Turkish credit card market.
To enhance customer loyalty and increase switching costs, banks provide non-price credit card benefits like money points, actual gifts, travel miles and higher number of installments, and improve the quality of their general banking services. We extensively deal with the switching cost and non-price competition arguments in another paper (Akin et al, 2009 ).
IV. Empirical Analysis of the Credit Card Rates in Turkey
Previous studies stress that the main determinant of the marginal cost for credit card issuers is the cost of funds. In addition, the cost of funds is the only part of the marginal cost that changes relatively frequently (Ausubel, 1991; Budde 2001) .
Therefore credit card interest rates are expected to move together with the cost of funds in the continuous spot market equilibrium (Ausubel, 1991) . Credit card operations of banks must be funded with short-term funds because of the unexpected liquidity constraints arising from the nature of credit cards. Hence, overnight interest rates or interest rates on short-term government bonds are likely proxies for the cost of funds in the credit card sector. Ausubel (1991) employs the T-bill interest rates in the US to account for the cost of funds. Similarly, in this paper the overnight interest rates, which display a parallel movement to T-bill rates, are used to proxy the cost of funds.
IV.1. The Model
In order to analyze the response of credit card interest rates to the changes in the cost of funds, these rates are regressed on their own lags and the lag of the cost of funds as:
where "rate" is the credit card interest rates of the issuers in the Turkish credit card market and "cost" is the interest rate on the Treasury Bills proxying the cost of funds. When we apply mean transformations to equation (1) we obtain:
where rate * i,t-1 = rate i,t-1 -1/(T-1)*(rate i2 + ….. + rate iT ) and
In the mean-transformed regression, the correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term is negative (Bond, 2002; Nickell, 1981) . Therefore we expect the coefficient on the lag of the dependent variable in this regression to be downward biased. The order of the correlation in the above regression is 1/(T-1) and therefore when T becomes large, this bias disappears.
Since applying OLS to equation (1) inflates the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable for short panels and applying Within Groups transformation creates a downward bias, both of these estimates are inconsistent. Bond (2002) suggests that the candidate for a consistent estimate should create a coefficient for the lagged dependent variable between these two estimates. When we apply a "firstdifference transformation" to the model in equation (1) we obtain:
First difference transformation removes the fixed effects but the lagged dependent variable in this transformation is still correlated with the error term. To see this, note that the term rate i,t-1 in Δrate i,t-1 = rate i,t-1 -rate i,t-2 is correlated with the term v i,t-1 in Δν it = ν it -ν i,t-1 . Fortunately, however, deeper lags of the lagged dependent variable are now uncorrelated with the transformed error term and they remain as instruments for the transformed lagged dependent variable in equation (3).
IV.2. Results
The results of the estimation of equation (1) are presented in Table 3 . OLS gives a higher coefficient than the Within Groups estimation in the regressions as can be seen in the first and second columns of The two-step system GMM estimation gives a coefficient of 0.37 for the lag of the cost of the funds. This coefficient indicates that a 10 percent decline in the cost of fund results in 3.7 percent reduction in credit card interest rates. Although this coefficient is statistically significant, in economic terms it is not a very substantial amount. In other words, credit card interest rates adjust to the changes in the cost of funds at a sluggish rate. This result provides empirical evidence for the lack of price competition in the Turkish credit card market.
Note that the Hansen test of joint validity does not work properly and it gives extremely good results such as a p value equal to 1 because the number of instruments (26) exceeds the number of the cross-sections (22) in this system GMM 12 In Table 3 and 4, m1 and m2 are the Arellano and Bond tests for first and second order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). The reported values for m1 and m2 are the p-values for the null hypothesis of no-serial correlation. In the OLS estimation they test the serial correlation in levels residuals, and in GMM-estimations they test the first differenced residuals. 13 First order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals is expected by construction since Δ ν it = ν it -ν i,t-1 and Δ ν i,t-1 = ν i,t-1 -ν i,t-2 share the same term, ν i,t-1 . What we need to check is the second order correlation in the first differenced residuals. The reason is that if there is a correlation between Δ ν it = ν it -ν i,t-1 and Δ ν i,t-2 = ν i,t-2 -ν i,t-3 , this indicates a first order correlation in levels due to the correlation between the v i,t-1 in first and v i,t-2 in the latter. If we find a second order correlation in differenced residuals, we can no longer use the twice lag of the dependent variable, rate i,t-2 , as an instrument for the first differenced lag of the dependent variable, Δrate i,t-1 , and therefore we need to use deeper lags of the dependent variable.
estimationSimulations show that if the panel series at hand are highly persistent, i.e. if they exhibit a pattern close to a random walk, then applying a "difference GMM" performs poorly and the results could be improved by using what is called a system GMM. To check for persistency, the credit card interest rates are regressed on their own lags and on time dummies. Bond (2002) shows in simulations that System GMM gives the best result in checking for persistency in panel data series. The results of these estimations are reported in Table 4 , along with OLS and Within
Group estimations which are presented for comparison. The coefficient on the lag of rate is 0.73 in the two-step system GMM regression and it is statistically significant. Steps in GMM 2 1 1
V. Conclusion
This study analyses price competition in the Turkish credit card market. In a competitive spot market model, a close connection is expected between credit card interest rates and the cost of funds for the credit card issuers (Ausubel, 1991) . 
